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Appellants KDN Management Inc. ("KDN"), Kym D. Nelson ("Nelson"), KD3 Flooring
LLC ("KD3"), and SealSource International, LLC ("SealSource" and, collectively, the "Nelson
Parties"), by and through counsel and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 34, submit
this Reply Brief, which replies to the Response Brief (the "Response") filed by Appellee WinCo
Foods, LLC ("WinCo").

ARGUMENT
WinCo's insistence, in its Response, that the District Court properly declined to convene
a jury trial, despite WinCo's stipulation and despite the years that the District Court scheduled
the case for jury trial, is legally and factually misplaced. As the following sections demonstrate,
the District Court either committed legal error or abused its discretion by failing to convene a
jury trial or, alternatively, abused its discretion by denying the Nelson Parties' Rule 39 Motion. 1
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision, vacate the judgment,
and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings, including a jury trial.
Alternatively, contrary to WinCo's Response, the Nelson Parties do not challenge the
District Court's findings of fact regarding Nelson's personal liability and the Nelson Parties'
alter ego liability. They challenge the District Court's articulation and application of governing
law. As the Nelson Parties previously explained, the Court should reverse and vacate Nelson's
personal liability, as well as each of the Nelson Parties' liability as alter egos of one another. But
at a minimum, viewed through the proper legal lenses, this Court should remand with

Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein carry the same meaning as defined in the Nelson
Parties' opening brief.
1
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instructions for the District Court to reduce Nelson's personal liability by $641,350.00, and to
eliminate her alter ego liability.

A.

WINCO CANNOT DEPART FROM ITS OWN STIPULATION, RELIED UPON
BY ALL PARTIES AND THE COURT FOR YEARS, TO A JURY TRIAL, AND
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE NELSON PARTIES
THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
"The Idaho constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in cases arising at common

law." Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115-16, 666 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Idaho 1983); see Idaho
Const. art. 1, § 7. The right to a jury trial in a civil case is "construed to apply as it existed at the
date of the adoption of the constitution." Blue Note, Inc. v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 152,157,377 P.2d
373,376 (1962). In other words, it merely "preserves the right to a trial by jury in cases at
common law." Rudd, 105 Idaho at 116, 666 P.2d at 643. But this Court has observed that
Article 1, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution exists because its framers "recognized that the jury
system is the single most important guardian of the people's right to be protected from
oppressive and overreaching government." David Steed & Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho
247,248, 766 P.2d 717, 718 (1988).
WinCo asserted claims arising at common law-specifically, claims for breach of
contract and fraud. R Vol. I, p. 851-52, 1381-83. Those claims incorporated numerous legal
issues. Assuming the satisfaction of any required conditions precedent, the Nelson Parties were
entitled to a jury trial on those claims. Even so, "on motion or on its own," the District Court
could convene an advisory jury. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(c)(l). With the parties' stipulation, it
could try any case to a jury. See id. 39(c)(2).
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Here, WinCo did exactly that: it stipulated to a jury trial. But WinCo's featured
argument on appeal is, apparently, that it was not bound by its own stipulation. For the
following numerous reasons-and for the simple sake of refusing to create precedent that a
party's long relied-upon stipulations don't matter-this Court should reject WinCo's argument.
Alternatively, this Court should conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by denying
the Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) Motion. Either way, the Court should vacate the District Court's
judgment and remand this case to the District Court for the jury trial to which the Nelson Parties
were entitled.
1.

WinCo Should Be Bound by Its Undisputed Stipulation to a Jury Trial.

WinCo does not dispute that its counsel's-its current counsel's-signature on the
November 12, 2014, Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning constitutes WinCo's stipulation to
try this case as a "12 Person Jury Trial." Aug P. 001-Aug P. 005. Rather, WinCo simply argues
that because neither party "demanded" a jury trial, it can step away from its stipulation at any
time. That is incorrect. The following sections explain that stipulations-generally, as well as
specifically regarding jury trials-are binding.
a. General Principles of Idaho Contract Law Require WinCo to Adhere to Its
Stipulation to a Jury Trial.
The concept of adhering to stipulations is engrained in Idaho law. "A stipulation is a
contract and its enforceability is determined by contract principles." Guzman v. Piercy, 155
Idaho 928, 936, 318 P.3d 918, 926 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "primary
objective when interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual intent of the parties at the time
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the contract is made." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007). "If possible,
the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best
indication of their intent." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A contract must "reflect[] a
meeting of the minds," embody "a distinct understanding common to both parties," and "be
specific enough to show that the parties shared a mutual intent." Gulf Chem. Employees Fed.
Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 893, 693 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1984). "In the absence of
ambiguity, the document must be constrned in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." Jim & Maryann Plane Family
Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 639, 645--46 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As long ago as 1925, this Court recognized that"[ s]tipulations between attorneys
relating to conduct of cases should be kept in good faith, and enforced when fair, reasonable, and
proper, unless good cause is shown to the contrary." Stewart Wholesale Co. v. Dist. Court, 41
Idaho 572,240 P. 597, 600 (1925).
Here, WinCo's stipulation is simple and clear: on November 12, 2014, its counsel
checked a box on a form entitled "Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning" indicating a "12
Person Jury Trial," and caused it to be filed with the District Court. Aug P. 001-Aug P. 005. It
bears emphasis that the document itself is captioned as a "Stipulation." Aug P. 001. The
document itself bespeaks a single purpose: to memorialize agreements between the parties
regarding the schedule that would govern the case. Aug P. 00 I -Aug P. 005.
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WinCo's stipulation plainly wasn't accidental. WinCo, via counsel, implicitly affirmed
its stipulation on no fewer than three occasions subsequent to its written stipulation. 2 On August
14, 2015, WinCo's counsel "agree[d]" with the District Court that WinCo's alter ego claims
would be "submit[ted] ... to the jury on an advisory basis," and that the District Court would
"incorporate the jury's findings into its finding and conclusions." KDN's liability would be
submitted "at the same time" to the jury. Tr Vol. I, p. 122, L. 9-18. On November 20, 2015, in
the context of a discussion among WinCo, the Nelson Parties, and the District Court, the District
Court indicated that it would "use advisory findings by the jury ... as part of its findings." Tr
Vol. I, p. 343, L. 21-p. 344, L. 14. And on March 20, 2016, WinCo's counsel-who signed the
stipulation on WinCo's behalf-"indicated that he thought that a jury trial would be acceptable
to WinCo as well." Tr Vol. I, p. 372, L. 3-6. In fact, WinCo did not question the convening of a
jury trial until April 4, 2016, less than two months before trial was set to begin, but more than
two years after the District Court had first scheduled a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 4, 3929. WinCo
actively pursued a jury trial until it perceived some strategic advantage in seeking a bench trialat which point it abandoned its prior, written, executed stipulation.
The Nelson Parties relied upon the fact that a jury trial had been scheduled since the
beginning of the case. WinCo amended its complaint on May 5, 2015. R Vol. I, p. 1370. That
amendment added claims against the Nelson Parties and, therefore, authorized a new demand for
a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 1370. The Nelson Parties did not respond to that amended complaint

Of course, as the Nelson Parties previously explained, this case was always slated to be
resolved via a jury trial.

2
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and did not request a jury trial. See generally R. There would have been no reason for them to
do so: WinCo had already stipulated to a jury trial. Had the Nelson Parties known that WinCo
reserved the right to withdraw its stipulation at its discretion, they could have demanded a jury
trial. Applying the universally accepted contractual principles ofldaho law that govern
stipulations, and particularly given that the Nelson Parties relied upon WinCo's stipulation, to
their detriment, WinCo should not be permitted to withdraw its stipulation. See Smith v. Boise

Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67,625 P.2d 417,421 (1981) ("A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of a promise or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Profits Plus

Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 891, 332 P.3d 785, 804 (2014) ("Promissory
estoppel is ... a substitute for consideration .... " (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to these universally accepted principles, the District Court should have held
WinCo to its stipulation to a jury trial.
b. Stipulations to a Jury Trial Are Enforceable in the Absence of a Jury Demand.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c)(2) provides that, "[i]n an action not triable ofright
by a jury, the court, on motion or on its own ... may, with the parties' consent, try an issue by a
jury whose verdict has the same effect as if a jury trial had been a matter ofright." See Idaho R.
Civ. P. 39(c)(2) (emphasis added). Whether a party has a jury trial as a matter ofright turns on
whether such a right existed at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted. See Anderson v.

Whipple, 71 Idaho 112,120,227 P.2d 351,355 (1951). Such a right did not, and does not now,
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exist for equitable claims. See id. Nevertheless, WinCo consented, via stipulation, to try at least
those claims for which there was not otherwise a jury trial right-including its claims for unjust
enrichment and alter ego. It does not matter whether the Nelson Parties demanded a trial by jury
for those claims or not, or whether Rule 39(c)(2) constitutes a basis for curing a failure to
demand a jury trial with a stipulation. The Nelson Parties wouldn't have been entitled to a jury
trial on WinCo's equitable claims in any event. But WinCo nevertheless stipulated to a jury trial
on those claims, and the District Court proceeded for years on that assumption. WinCo cannot
lead the District Court to so readily turn its back on that stipulation. See Hildebrand v. Bd. of

Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 39(c) "permits both sides to stipulate to a jury trial," and although a district court
does not have to accept that stipulation, once it does, "it does not have unbridled discretion to
change its mind"). Indeed, parties can waive a previously-demanded jury trial with a stipulation.

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(d) ("A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.").
It makes no sense whatsoever that they cannot obtain a jury trial by stipulation.

In fact, stipulations to a jury trial are commonly enforced. In AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v.

Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1965), the parties agreed "by stipulation" to a jury trial.
See id. at 155. The presidingjudge in the district court approved the stipulation and set the case
for jury trial. See id. But "on the eve of trial to a jury, the court ... vacated its order and the
setting of the case on the jury docket and denied ajury trial." Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the district court "abused [its] discretion, if discretion [it] had under the existing
circumstances, in denying a jury trial." Id.; see McKinney v. Gannett Co. , Inc., 817 F.2d 659,
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673-74 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that Cunningham dealt with a circumstance where a
district court "had reinstated the [jury trial] right on stipulation of the parties"); see also

Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1992) (enforcing two stipulations to a jury
trial contained in "pretrial orders"); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814
(N.D. Tex. 2002) (enforcing a stipulation to a jury trial against a party who later claimed that the
opposing party had waived its right to a jury trial).
In this long-running case, the Nelson Parties had changed counsel by the time WinCo
sought to eliminate the jury trial. But WinCo had the same counsel-indeed, the same counsel
that executed the November 12, 2014, stipulation on its behalf. It was WinCo, and not the
Nelson Parties, that sought to escape that prior stipulation. The District Court should not have
permitted WinCo to do so.

2.

Even if WinCo Is Not Bound to Its Stipulation, the District Court Abused
Its Discretion by Denying the Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) Motion.

Portions of WinCo's argument are correct, as far as they go: whether to convene a jury
trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3 9(b) motion is committed to the district court's
sound discretion, and the Idaho Supreme Court has never reversed a district court's denial of a
Rule 39(b) motion. But the fact that this Court has never reversed such a denial does not mean
that all such motions should be denied; this Court simply exercises proper deference to district
courts' sound discretion in this matter. And this case contains two key facts that no Idaho
appellate decision-certainly not any decision WinCo cites-has addressed: the party seeking to
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avoid a jury trial actually stipulated, in writing, to a jury trial, and the district court proceeded to
a jury trial for over two years after stipulation.
WinCo argues that the Nelson Parties' citation to federal decisions ignores Idaho's
purportedly differing standard with respect to Rule 39(b) motions. That is false. Idaho law
requires district courts to "liberally exercise [their] discretion [to convene jury trials] upon
request] to carry out the designed purpose of the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure." See R. E. W
Constr. Co. v. Dist. Court of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426,443,400 P.2d 390,401
(1965) (emphasis added). And Idaho law provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by
the Constitution or as provided by a statute of the state of Idaho is preserved to the parties
inviolate." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(a). WinCo points to several decisions indicating that a
district court cannot grant a Rule 39(b) motion where the only proffered basis is "oversight." See
Krussman v. Omaha Woodmen Life Ins. Soc'y, 2 F.R.D. 3 (D. Idaho 1941); see also Pac.
Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd, 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001); Chandler
Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 1980). Leaving aside the irony that
WinCo doesn't cite any Idaho state cases for that proposition Gust as WinCo chides the Nelson
Parties), those decisions do not teach that Idaho applies a "different" standard to Rule 39(b)
motions. And the case before the Court is not a circumstance of inadvertence. WinCo stipulated
to a jury trial and then conveniently forgot about that stipulation. The Nelson Parties'
"assumption" was not an assumption at all, but based on the District Court's docket, which had
contained jury trial setting since January 2013, over three and a half years prior to the date upon
which WinCo started the process of wiggling out of its own stipulation.
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WinCo unsuccessfully seeks to distinguish Pinemont v. Belk, 722 F.2d 232 (5th Cir.
1984). Contrary to WinCo's argument, it was WinCo that caused confusion: the presiding judge
and the Nelson Parties' counsel both changed since the date of its stipulation to a jury trial, but
WinCo's counsel remained the same. Yet it was WinCo that sought to avoid a jury trial without
ever once noting to the District Court that WinCo had stipulated to a jury trial. The District
Court itself recognized the importance of a stipulation-it had its clerk review the file to locate
such a stipulation, without success. Tr Vol. I, p. 359 L. 11 17. Its error wus not ignoring
WinCo's stipulation, but rather failing to appreciate that the record contained such a stipulation
in the first place. Of course, WinCo did not point out that it had previously stipulated to a jury
trial.
WinCo is correct that an amended complaint can trigger an effective jury demand only if
it adds new issues. But that explains why it is so inequitable to deprive the Nelson Parties of a
jury trial. As explained above, the Nelson Parties relied upon WinCo's stipulation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to
convene a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39(b).

B.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT ON
ALTERNATIVE BASES.
The fact that the Nelson Parties were deprived of a jury trial, despite WinCo's undisputed

stipulation, is reason enough for this Court to reverse the District Court, vacate the judgment, and
remand. But in the alternative, this Court should reverse the District Court on other bases, none
of which WinCo persuasively addresses. In this Reply Brief, the Nelson Parties do not restate
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those arguments here, but rather point out the glaring inconsistencies in WinCo's arguments and
the District Court's analysis of Nelson's personal liability. This Court should reverse the District
Court's determinations of Nelson's personal liability in their entirety, but at a minimum, it
should reduce her liability by the amount of damages attributed to the Boise Agreement. It
should also reverse the District Court's determination of alter ego for all Nelson Parties, but at a
minimum, for Nelson personally. 3
1.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Finding of Nelson's Personal
Liability Pursuant to the Undisclosed Principle Rule.

In its Response, WinCo characterizes the Nelson Parties' argument as a disguised attack
on the District Court's findings of fact subject to clear error review. That is incorrect.
The District Court went astray regarding its definition of an indefinite-services contract.
It correctly recognized that, with such a contract, "the buyer must be obligated to purchase a
minimum quantity in order for the agreement to be enforceable," and "without an obligatory
minimum quantity, the buyer would be allowed to order nothing, rendering its obligations
illusory and, therefore, unenforceable." R Vol. I, p. 5034 (quoting Torncello v. United States,
681 F.2d 756, 761 (Cl. Ct. 1982)). But the District Court ignored the rule that if an indefinitequantities contract includes a guaranteed minimum quantity, the "proper remedy" is to enforce
the guaranteed minimum quantity provision and "to sever the unenforceable provision"-the

Although WinCo refers, at nearly every chance it gets, to the District Court's imposition of
adverse inferences as sanctions for discovery violations, the Nelson Parties do not challenge the
District Court's ruling in that regard, and it confines its arguments to legal errors rather than
challenges to factual determinations. The District Court's resolution of the discovery issues in
this case is immaterial to the Nelson Parties' appeal.
3
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illusory promise to purchase an indefinite amount of goods in the future. See United Services
Auto. Ass'n v. Pelis, No. 51969-7-I, 2004 WL 792666, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. April 12, 2004);
see also Cummings-Reedv. United Health Group, No. 2:15-CV-02359-JAM-AC, 2016 WL
1734873, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016). The parties then become legally obligated or
accountable to each other for future purchases only upon the "contemporaneous exchange of
consideration"-meaning, in this circumstance, new and definite promises to buy and sell. Cf
TMC Worldwide, L.I'. v. Gray, 178 S.W.Jd 29, 37 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
The Nelson Parties do not challenge, and do not need to challenge, the District Court's
findings. The District Court itself found as follows:
37.
In addition, WinCo and Ms. Nelson, orally agreed no later than
January of 2010 that KD Concrete would perform the work on three "test stores"
in WinCo's Portland Division pursuant to the agreed-upon terms and, if WinCo
was satisfied with the work, KD Concrete could continue the work in WinCo's
other stores under the same terms on an as-needed basis.
R Vol. I, p. 5012. The District Court also found:
41.
The first time Ms. Nelson disclosed KDN's existence to WinCo
was on or about April 30, 2010, when she sent a W-9 tax form to WinCo's billing
department disclosing the name of the entity: "KDN Management, Inc. /dba KD
Concrete Design."
R Vol. I, p. 5014. Finally, the District Court found as follows :
52.
On May 4, 2010, Ms. Nelson provided Mr. Douty with a proposed
joint repair schedule for the Boise Division stores that needed work. ...
53.
Between mid-May and November 2010, and pursuant to KDN's
authorization, D&B completed work at sixteen Boise Division stores, to wit: # 16,
#50, #43, #8, #2, #45, #29, #68, #70, #27, #48, #30, #42, #6, #11 and #1.
R Vol. I, p. 5015-16.
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The Boise Agreement must constitute an agreement separate from the Trial Period and
the Portland Agreement. Otherwise, key Idaho rules regarding contract formation would be
violated. "[T]o be enforceable, an agreement must be sufficiently definite and certain in its
terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when
performance is complete." Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 892,
155 P.3d 691,693 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] reservation to either party of
an unlimited right to determine the nature and extent of his performance renders his obligation
too indefinite for legal enforcement, making it, as it is termed, merely illusory." Thomas v. Cate,
78 Idaho 29, 32,296 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1956) (quoting Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 167 A. 79,
81 (Me. 1933)).
Given that the Boise Agreement was entered into after April 30, 2010, when even the
District Court found that Nelson had furnished notice of KDN's existence and status, the District
Court, at a minimum, should have reduced Nelson's personal liability under the undisclosed
principal by at least the amount of the payment delivered in connection with the Boise
Agreement. See Crosse v. Callis, 282 A.2d 86, 91 (Md. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that even
though a disclosure was "not made until after one contract had been entered into, the disclosure
would be operative as to further contracts if fully made before such new contracts are
consummated"). Although this Court should entirely reverse the District Court's decision as set
forth in the Nelson Parties' opening brief, it should at least reduce the amount of Nelson's
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personal liability by the amount of payments made pursuant to the Boise Agreement. Based on
the District Court's findings, that reduction should be $641,350.00. 4

2.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Finding of Pre-Incorporation
Liability Pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-204.

Again, WinCo's Response couches the Nelson Parties' argument as factual, but it is, in
fact, legal. The District Court found that "[o]n February 18, 2010, Ms. Nelson incorporated
KDN .... " R Vol. I, p. 5014. Idaho Code§ 30-1-204 states that "[a]ll persons purporting to act
as or on behalf of a corporation, when there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly
and severally liable for liabilities created while so acting." "[L ]iabilities," as used in LC. § 30-1204, arise when a contract is executed-meaning when the parties become "legally obligated or
accountable," not when the contract is breached. See Liability, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014); see e.g., Silvers v. R & FCapital Corp., 858 P.2d 895,897 (Or. App. 1993).
As explained supra, as a matter of law, the Boise Agreement had to be a separate
agreement. There was no agreement regarding work on Boise stores until May 2010-well after
KDN's incorporation. Again, although this Court should entirely reverse the District Court's
decision as set forth in the Nelson Parties' opening brief, it should at least reduce the amount of
Nelson's personal liability by the amount of payments made pursuant to the Boise Agreement.
Again, that reduction should be in the amount of $641,350.00.

The Nelson Parties compute that amount by taking the list of the stores comprising the
Boise Agreement, R Vol. I, p. 5015-16, subtracting those for which the District Court
already granted an offset, and adding the District Court's computation of the overcharges
for each store, R Vol. I, p. 5019-20.
4
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3.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Determination that Each of
the Nelson Parties Are Alter Egos of One Another.

The District Court found that "assets were meticulously siphoned off by Ms. Nelson and
her other two companies, knowing KDN had a potential outstanding significant liability to
WinCo." R Vol. I, p. 5051. That finding contains two elements: Nelson's alleged "meticulous
siphoning" of assets, and her alleged knowledge of liability to WinCo. Each element is not
based in law.
Regarding Nelson's alleged knowledge, WinCo's Response does not meaningfully
reconcile two competing realities: how can the Nelson Parties know of their potential liability to
WinCo, even though WinCo never asserted a fraud claim against any of the Nelson Parties
covering all of the WinCo stores upon which work was performed? Indeed, the District Court's
own finding-which the Nelson Parties do not challenge-was that "Ms. Nelson has no
personal knowledge regarding the accuracy of the measurements" of the Win Co stores. R Vol.
I, p. 5021. The District Court's findings-one that Nelson knew ofliability, but another that she
didn't know of inaccurate measurements-conflict. And knowledge of falsity would form the
basis of a fraud claim, which WinCo did not assert. See April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156
Idaho 500,509,328 P.3d 480,489 (2014) (outlining elements of a claim for fraud, including "the
speaker's knowledge of [a factual statement's] falsity"). Fraud, injustice, or inequity is a key
component of a Utah alter ego analysis. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 500 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). Without it, a mere withdrawal of funds by shareholders does not support an alter
ego finding as a matter oflaw. See Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,, 27,
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284 P.3d 630 ("[M]erely demonstrating that shareholders withdrew funds from corporate
accounts is an insufficient basis on which to pierce the corporate veil absent additional evidence
that the withdrawals were not legitimate or that the company failed to properly account for the
withdrawals.")
Regarding the withdrawals themselves, WinCo does not meaningfully address the reality
that KDN was ans-corporation, the income of which is, for all intents and purposes, Nelson's
income. Sec United States v. Rouhani, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1230 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (forfeiture
case) (s-corporation income "is treated as the personal income of the individual stockholder").
"[I]n a Subchapter S corporation the shareholders may withdraw as much as the corporation's
retained earnings account contains .... [I]t is not unusual for a Subchapter S corporation to make
payments to family members or for family-owned vehicles. The relevant inquiry is whether those
payments are charged to a shareholder's account and whether the shareholder is entitled to
withdraw the amount, through his or her account, from the corporation." Commercial Cabinet,
Inc. v. Quint, 2003 WL 22962070, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2003) (unpublished
disposition).
The District Court itself found that WinCo did not assert any grievance regarding any
billing until at least November 2011-over a year after KDN finished work in Boise. R Vol. I, p.
5016-57 (findings of fact 53, 61-63). Therefore, its sole material basis for its alter ego
determination is that Nelson compensated herself via an s-corporation (which she is allowed to
do), for a job completed a year previously, having no knowledge of any inaccurate
measurements. As a matter of Utah law, that does not amount to alter ego. Given that Nelson is
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the connective tissue joining each of the Nelson Parties, he Court should reverse the District
Court's determination of alter ego in its entirety. At a minimum, it should reverse that
determination as it pertains to Nelson.

CONCLUSION
WinCo fails to explain why it should be released from its long-relied-upon stipulation to
a jury trial. The Court should reverse, vacate, and remand on that basis alone. Alternatively, the
Court should reverse and remand with instructions for the District Court to eliminate Nelson's
personal liability or, at a minimum, reduce it by $641,350.00.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2018.
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

By:-=._ _ _____..._ __ __,__ _ __
Stacy J. McNeill
Barry N. Johnson (admitted HV)
Daniel K. Brough (admitted PHV)
Attorneys for Appellants
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